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In April

14,

Idaho

Police pulled

Garcia-Rodriguez over for purportedly

committing a traffic offense, detained him for over an hour, arrested him for driving without a
""'"'"'--'"'· and then searched him incident to his arrest. The district court granted tv1r. Garcia-

Rodriguez's motion to suppress all of the evidence against him because the Idaho State Police
no reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez, unlawfully prolonged his detention,
and had no probable cause to mTest him.

The State appeals from the district court's order

Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's motion to suppress, and argues that the stop, detention, and
search incident to arrest were lawful. The State's cursory and conclusory argument fails to show
that the district court erred.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
One

in April 2014, Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez exited I-84 in

County.

(R., p.175.) Trooper Otto exited the highway behind him, as seen in a video taken by Trooper
Otto's dash camera. (Id; State's Ex.

to 6/3/2014 Motion to Suppress Hearing.) Trooper Otto

saw Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez cross the right fog line by roughly the width of his tires as
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez drove on the off-ramp.

(R., p.175.)

Trooper Otto was supposedly

concerned that he was impaired or was having vehicle issues, and so Trooper Otto pulled him
over. (R., p.176.)
At I: 16 p.m., Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez parked his car directly in front of a gas station
convenience store, and Trooper Otto pulled in right behind him.

(Id)

As Trooper Otto

approached Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's car, Trooper Otto noticed a Hertz rental sticker in the back

contact

)

a

line,

that he stopped him for

told

never investigated whether Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was impaired or having car
troubles.

(Id.)

When Trooper Otto asked Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez for his driver's license,
listed a

Garcia-Rodriguez gave him his Mexican consular identification
Gooding, Idaho

Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez what his name was,

(Id) Trooper Otto

and Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez truthfully responded "Victor." (R., pp.176-77.) He told Trooper Otto
that the car belonged to his friend, Bill. (R., p.177.) Trooper Otto asked for the

registration

and insurance, which Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez could not find. (R., p.177.) Trooper Otto thought
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez \Vas avoiding
asked Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez to look in
said no.

center console of the car because, when Trooper Otto
closed it,

center console, he opened it "a

(Id.)

Trooper Otto

Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez to get out of the car: "I

being truthful with me ... I had him

that

wasn't

the vehicle just in case any weapons or the chance of

him driving off .... " (Id.) According to the district court, Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez could not have
driven off because Trooper Otto's car blocked him in. (R., p.176.) Further, the court found that
"the request to exit the vehicle \Vas not for the purpose of investigating a DUI and there was no
indication [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] was intoxicated." (R., p.177.)

Otto then requested

that Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez empty his pockets. (Id.) Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez took a cell phone,
wallet, and set of keys from his pockets and showed them to Trooper Otto. (Id.) Trooper Otto

2

to

and to

a

a

s

ever

not

to

com1. (Id.) According to Trooper Otto, the Idaho State Police are told not to look up that
information, even though it is readily available. (Id.)
Trooper Otto then went into the gas station to ask if anyone spoke Spanish so that they
could translate. (Id) When Trooper Otto returned, he asked Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez how long he
had the car, and Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez said he went to visit his mother. (Id.)

Mr. Garcia-

Rodriguez also denied having any drugs, including methamphetamine, in the car. (Id.) Just as
Trooper Otto asked whether he could search for himself, Hope Tappan approached Trooper Otto
to translate for him.

(Id.)

Trooper Otto explained, through Ms. Tappan, that he stopped

Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez for crossing the white line and "immediately ask[ed] for consent to search
the vehicle." (Id.) Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez said that Trooper Otto could search the car, and that he
was going to buy a car in

Falls. (R.,

179.)

At that point, Ms. Tappan left, and Trooper Otto searched the car. (Id.) Trooper Otto
went directly to the center console, and found approximately $10,000 in cash inside of a shaving
kit.

(Id.) Trooper Otto then placed Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez in handcuffs and put Mr. Garcia-

Rodriguez in Trooper Otto's patrol car, but stated that Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was not under
arrest. (Id.) Trooper Otto said he was going to find Ms. Tappan to translate. (Id.) Instead,
Trooper Otto continued to search the shaving kit, and a few minutes later four more officers
arrived on scene. (Id.)

1

According to Trooper Otto, the El Paso Intelligence Center consolidates information reported
by various agencies throughout the country. (R., p.178.)

3

consent was no
a

fail to appear
to

court (Id.)

Otto

dispatch to contact Hertz for permission

the car, and learned that the car was rented by Bill Walker. (R., p.180.)

officers

talked about the cash they found in the car as "bundled not how people get cash ... it's
bundled like a drug dealer." (Id.) Finally, the officers agreed that if Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez were
to waive ownership of the money, they could

it and "'cut him loose."' (Id.)

A Spanish-speaking officer, Trooper Anderson, then A1irandized Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez
began asking him questions. (Id.) Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez explained that the money was
just received a tax return for about $5,000, had been saving money, and participated in a
"tanda" through his work. (R., pp.180-81.) The officers believed the tanda vvas a form of illegal
gambling, and so Trooper Anderson began asking
who pai1icipated,

the tanda

of community saving system, not a form

Garcia-Rodriguez questions about how it
(R., p.181.)

"tanda" is in

a

gambling. (R., p.181 n.11.) Trooper Otto then

decided to seize the money because he thought

defendant was lying about where he got the

money and said that ifit was actually his money, he should "prove it." (R., p.181.)
Trooper Otto then got his drug dog out of his patrol car and walked the dog around
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's car. (Id.) Trooper Otto said the dog alerted but it was "really weak" and
then that ''the dog alerted but didn't indicate." (R., pp.181-82.) The officers speculated that
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez had just dropped off drugs-they called it the "popcorn effect."

(R., p.182.) The police never found any drugs in Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's car. (Id.)

4

for

At 2:30

to

a

) For
,.,.,,,...,,,. Otto claimed

had noticed a "bulge" in Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's pocket from the

beginning. (Id.) Trooper Otto never mentioned that to any of the other officers, nor did he ask
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez about it. (Id.)
The State later charged Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez with methamphetamine trafficking and
possession of paraphernalia (R., pp.49-50), and Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress
all of the evidence against him (R., p.69).
The district court granted the motion, finding that the stop, continued detention, and
arrest were all unlawful. (R., pp.204-206.) The district court's decision was grounded in its
distrust of Trooper Otto and its disapproval of the officers' reliance on unfounded assumptions
and stereotypes in interacting with Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez. Specifically, the court found:
"Trooper Otto exited the highway with some purpose-Trooper Otto passes a
vehicle heading eastbound at ,vhat appears to be great speed and exits the
interstate almost directly through the right hand lane. In doing so, it appears
to the Court he is already focused on [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's] vehicle."
(R., p.175 n.1.)
~

"At no point during the entire duration of detention did [Trooper] Otto ask any
questions directed at whether [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] ,vas impaired or if the
vehicle was having issues-concerns that Trooper Otto stated he had prior to
stopping [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez]." (R., p.176 n.2.)

•

"At 1:43 the officers discuss how they can search the vehicle, as it is unlikely
the consent is still valid with [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] detained. It is suggested
that [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] could be arrested for 'failure to purchase' and the
officers could subsequently do an inventory on the car. At this time there is
no discussion of factors leading the officers to believe [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez]
would not appear in court or justifying an arrest for that charge." (R., pp.17980.)

5

not
can

is one
connected in any fashion with drugs or illegal activity." (R., p.180 n.9.)
•

"Trooper Otto, at the mention of a tax return, fixated on this issue,
disbelieving that [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] would receive a tax return because
of his illegal status and if he did there should be paper vvork. . . . This belief is
an unfounded conclusion. . . . Additionally, if [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] did
receive a tax return it would be incredibly improbable that he would carry his
tax return with him." (R., p.181 n.10.)

•

"Trooper Otto testified that he did not say that the alert was weak. However
this Court finds that he did after review of the video. This statement is clear
and loud (unlike when other officers are speaking to Trooper Otto) and the
voice is consistent with Trooper Otto's throughout the video." (R., p.182
n.12.)

•

"It is easy to look at this case and conclude, vvhat's the problem?-the police
caught a drug trafficker. That, ordinarily, would translate to good police
work. That is not the problem. The problem in this case is each and every
aspect of this case before the police discovered the drugs." (R., p.197 n.25.)

The State timely appealed, arguing that the stop, detention, and search incident arrest
were lawful. (R., pp.209-11.)

6

to

court

7

of
of a suppression motion is
a
a
to suppress is challenged, v.-e accept the trial court's findings
which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application
constitutional principles to the facts as found. At a suppression hearing, the
po,ver to assess the credibility of \Vitnesses, res0I,1e factual conflicts, \Veigh
evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.
v. Cutler,

I

Idaho 297, 301 (Ct. App. 2006) (internal
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's motion to suppress all

district court correctly

evidence seized in this case because the stop, prolonged detention,

search incident to arrest

were unlawful. By glossing over or ignoring

key factual findings and

of the district

legal conclusions, the State has failed to provide this Court with any substantiated reason to
reverse the district court
its position.

has failed to preserve many of the arguments

to support

State has not shown that the district court erred by granting Mr. Garciato

The United

so this
Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches

seizures.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17. Warrantless searches and seizures are
presumptively unreasonable. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Halen v.

State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). To overcome that presumption, the State has the burden of
proving that the search or seizure falls \Vithin a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement

was reasonable in light of

surrounding circumstances.

Schneckloth,

412 U.S. at 219; Schrnerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (overruled on other grounds
in 1vfissouri v. A1cNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1555 (2013)); Halen, 136 Idaho at 833.

If the

government fails to meet its burden, the evidence acquired as a result of the illegal search or

8

V.

11,

1

371

9

Trooper Otto Stopped Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez Without Reasonable Suspicion
must generally be
based on probable cause. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop,
1

Idaho 804, 811 (2009). However, limited investigatory detentions such as traffic stops are

permissible when "justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has
committed, or is about to commit, a crime.'' State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013).
"Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences
that can be drawn from those facts. Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.
of the circumstances knmvn to

The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the
officer at or before the

of the stop." Id. (internal

and quotations omitted).
The district court found that neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion justified the
stop in this case. (R., pp.183-191.) The district court dismissed LC.§ 49-808 as a justification
for the stop because, contrary to the State's contention, Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez used his turn
signals properly. (R., pp.187-88.) The court also found that '·the State failed to even argue that
[Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez violated] LC. §§ 49-637 and 49-630," but

concluded that

Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez did not violate those statutes when he crossed the fog line on a single-lane
off-ramp.

(R., p.187.)

The court further found that briefly crossing the fog line, initially

signaling right, and then signaling left, did not give rise to a reasonable susp1c10n that

9

car

or was

Idaho 293 (Ct App. 2001),

Garcia-Rodriguez
§ 49-630, and State v.

2014 WL 5151426 (Ct. App.

41

15, 201

(reversed by State v. Neal, 362 P.3d 514 (2015)), 2 which discusses LC.§ 49-637. 3 (App. Brief,
pp.5-6.)

alone argued, that the district court incorrectly

But the State has not claimed,
LC. §§ 49-630

49-637 as inapplicable to single-lane off-ramps.

Regardless, the district court correctly found that neither probable cause nor reasonable
suspicion supported the stop.

plain language of I.C. §§ 49-630 and 49-637 applies

only to highways with two or nwre lanes.
any highway has been divided

(R., pp.185-87.) LC. § 49-637(1) provides that
lanes for traffic

two (2) or more clearly

... [a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a
that
with safety."

the Idaho Supreme

highway has been divided into two
applies to highways with at least two

and shall not
movement can

concluded in Neal, "the plain meaning of 'whenever
or more clearly marked lanes' is

statute only

of travel and excludes one-lane roads."

Neal,

P.3d at 521. LC. § 49-630(1)(d) provides that: "Upon all highways of sufficient width a

2

The Court of Appeals in Neal held that driving on, but not across, a fog line violated the
requirement that a vehicle remain within its lane. Neal, 2014 WL 5151426. Mr. GarciaRodriguez moved to suspend this appeal pending the Idaho Supreme Court's review of Neal.
The Idaho Supreme Court decided that case in November, holding that "driving onto but not
across the line marking the right edge of the road does not violate Idaho Code section 49-637."
Neal, 362 P.3d at 522.
3 The State did not argue there was probable cause to justify the stop, nor did the State argue that
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was driving under the influence justified the
stop.
10

the

on

of the

of a

is

the

words, there must be two or more lanes running in opposite directions for LC. § 49-630(1) to
apply.

Indeed, the purpose of these statutes is to "manag[e] traffic safety vis-a-vis other

vehicles." Neal, 362 P.3d at 520 ("The fact that this portion of Idaho's motor vehicle code
contains all the rules relating to rights of way and safety management regarding other vehicles
supports the construction that section 49-637(1) regulates the interaction of traffic between
lanes, not a driver's interaction with the sidewalk, curb, or shoulder."). Because Mr. GarciaRodriguez undisputedly crossed the fog line on a single-lane, one-way off-ramp, neither
LC.§§ 49-637(1) or 49-630(1) applies, and Trooper Otto had no reasonable suspicion to stop
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez.
For this same reason, the State's reliance on Slater is misplaced. 4 The Slater Court held
that the police had reasonable suspicion that

violated I

§ 49-630(1) because Slater's

tires crossed the fog line on an on-ramp as he entered a highway. Slater, 136 Idaho at 296, 298.
But it appears Slater did not make the argument that Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez makes here-that
I.C. § 49-630(1) does not apply in the first place because Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was on a singlelane, one-way off-ramp when he crossed the fog line. Indeed, there is no evidence one way or
the other whether the on-ramp in Slater had a single lane or multiple lanes, though the Court
explained that the exceptions in I.C. § 49-630(1), which include "a highway restricted to one-

Again, as explained above, the State did not cite to I.C. § 49-630 in its briefing below.
(R., pp.79-87, 117-22.) And on appeal, the State has not challenged the district court's finding
that LC. § 49-630 did not apply to a single-lane off-ramp, and did not cite to Slater for the
proposition that I.C. § 49-630 in fact applies to single-lane off-ramps. (App. Br., pp.5-6.)
4

11

not

at

' 1

not

not
no

l

failed to show that the district comi

stop.

by finding that

),

stop was not supported

suspicion, and

the district court correctly suppressed the evidence seized as a result.

B.

If a person is detained,
underlying justification.

scope of their detention must be carefully tailored to its

, 460 U.S. at 500; see also State v. Grantham, 1

Idaho 490, 496

(Ct. App. 2008). An

detention "must be temporary and last no longer than is

necessary to effectuate

of the stop.

146 Idaho at

"Authority for [a]

thus

reasonably should
(2015) (internal
should be the least

Royer, 460 U.S. at 500; see also Grantham,
when

to the infraction are-or

States, 135

Ct. 1609, 1614

omitted) (emphasis added). "[T]he investigative methods employed
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion

in a short period of time." Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
An officer "may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful stop. But
.. he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily
demanded to justify detaining an individual." Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (internal citations
omitted); see also Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496. Therefore, officers can only expand "the length
and scope of the initial investigatory detention ... if there exist objective and specific articulable

12

reasonable suspicion

or 1s

the

V.

to

court found

unreasonable because Trooper Otto prolonged the stop longer than necessary to issue a citation
for a driving infraction and because there was no reason to believe Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was,
had been, or was about to engage in a crime. (R., p.192.)
The State has not listed the prolonged detention as an issue in this case, 5 and made only
t\VO statements regarding the prolonged detention. 6 First, in a header, the State claims that "The
Continued Detention And Eventual Arrest Of Garcia Was Supported By Probable Cause." (App.
p.6.)

The State later claims that the "[a]pplication of relevant legal standards show

Trooper Otto almost immediately developed probable cause of a new crime, driving without a
license, which justified Garcia's continued detention." (App. Brief p.8.) By failing to support
these bald conclusions with the relevant legal standards and argument, the State has waived the
issue.

v. Zichko, 1

Idaho

263 (1996) ("When

on

appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be

The Issue in the Appellant's Briefis: "Did the district court err by suppressing because the stop
was justified by reasonable suspicion, the arrest was justified by probable cause, and the search
of Garcia's person was proper incident to arrest?
6 In a footnote, the State posits that "[i]t appears that the district comi concluded that the consent
leading to discovery of the cash was involuntary based on the court's conclusion there was an
illegal detention." (App. Brief, p.7 n.l.) But then the State goes on to argue that consent given
during a lawful detention does not demonstrate coercion, and that the circumstances as a whole
did not evidence coercion. (Id) The State has missed the point. If Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's
prolonged detention was not lawful (and the State has failed to give this Court any authority or
argument for why it was lawful), then any evidence obtained during that unlawful detention,
regardless of whether the circumstances were otherwise coercive, is inadmissible. See State v.
Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 653 (Ct. App. 2002) ("A consent to search given during an illegal
detention is tainted by the illegality and is therefore ineffective.") (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 50708). State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 87 4 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Consent to search does not expunge
the taint of unlawful police activity where the events are irrevocably intertwined.").
5

13

an

... A

IS

transcript

citations to the authorities, statutes

record

").

that Trooper Otto's prolonged detention of

Moreover, the district court correctly
Garcia-Rodriguez was unlawful:

Because Trooper Otto's only justification for stopping [Mr. Garciaand that
Rodriguez] was to issue, at best, a citation for some driving
objective, along with any additional citation for Failing to Purchase a Driver's
License, could have reasonably been accomplished by 1:26 p.m. !Just before
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez gave Trooper Otto consent to search his car], any
continued detention, without further evidence of wrongdoing or illegal activity
(which there was none), unlawfully expanded the scope and purpose of the stop.
(R., p.195.)

If Trooper Otto wished to issue Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez a citation,
have done so long before 1:26 p.m.
146
no

at 496. The

Royer, 460 U.S. at 500;

was in
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was likely to appear in court-

aimed at determining

"[q]uite frankly,

Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct at 161

could and should

(R., p.194)-and there was no other

an inquiry never

legitimate reason to extend the length of the stop. See Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho at 614-15. The
district court correctly

as a result of the prolonged detention.

all

A search incident to a lawful arrest is exempted from the Fourth Amendment's warrant

requirement. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 815.

warrantless arrest and warrantless search incident to

that arrest is lawful if the arresting officer has probable cause to believe the arrestee has

14

at 817.

a

a man

cause 1s
an

"

(1

LC.§ 49-1407 provides:

Whenever any person is halted by a peace officer for any misdemeanor
,,riolation of the pro\risions of this title and is not required to be take11 before a
magistrate, the person shall, in the discretion of the officer, either be given a
traffic citation or be taken without unnecessary delay before the proper magistrate
... in the following cases:
(1) When the person
not furnish satisfactory evidence of identity or
when the officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person will
disregard a written promise to appear in court.
(Emphasis added.)
The district court found that

Otto had no probable cause to arrest Mr. Garcia-

Rodriguez for failure to purchase a license '"'""u"" Trooper Otto had no reasonable and probable
to believe
court

would

Trooper Otto's subjective belief

objectively unreasonable; the officers

court. (R., pp.199-204.) The

to

a

Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was dishonest as
substantial amount of information" that

officers learned about Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez and his ties to the area, made absolutely no
to investigate whether Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was telling the truth,
turned a blind

"intentionally

to information on the most pressing issue they had to determine-whether

[Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] was likely to appear."
and

(R., pp.200-03.)

grounds to

Because there were no

would not appear, there was

no probable cause for his arrest.
The State argues, for the first

on appeal, that Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's arrest was

lawful under Virginia v. },1oore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008), simply because he drove without a license.
(App.

7.)

Because the

that

not

15

court

identification, spoke little English, was not in law enforcement
databases, was driving a car

by someone else, and had bricks of cash Trooper Otto

associated with drug trafficking," Trooper Otto had grounds to arrest because he was not likely
to appear for court. 7 (App. Brief, p.7 (citing I.C. § 49-1407).) As the district court found, those
circumstances have little or no bearing on the analysis, are outweighed by the evidence that
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez would appear in court, and are undennined by the officers' utter failure to
actually investigate

Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was likely to appear. (R., pp.200-04.)

Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's Mexican consular identification listed Mr. Gonzalez's real name
and a Gooding

, and Trooper Otto had no reason to believe the identification was

falsified. (Id.) Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's immigration status and inability to speak English do not
that

was not likely to

given that

the country illegally and said

had lived and worked

(See R., p.202.)

That Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was not found

openly acknowledged

was

111

the area for over a decade.
111

law enforcement databases is

neither remarkable nor indicative that he would fail to appear-again, the officers knew from the
beginning that he was in the country illegally, and the databases did not reveal outstanding arrest
\Varrants or criminal convictions.

As for the rental car, Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez

(See id.)

explained to Trooper Otto that he borrowed the car from his friend Billy to visit his family.

7

The State cites to LC. § 49-1407(1) generally, so it is unclear whether the State also intends to
argue that the arrest was warranted based on unsatisfactory identification. To the extent the State
intends to argue as much, the district court recognized that the State failed to make that argument
below and that Mr. Garcia-Gonzalez did in fact provide satisfactory evidence of identity.
(R., p.199.)
16

Otto's

none

m
(See

it was

Garcia-Rodriguez's mere possession of cash,

pp.200, 202.) Finally,

more, does not mean he was associated with drug trafficking. (See R., p.201.) The
court found as much (R., p.196-97), and the State has failed to challenge (let alone
mention) that finding

App. Br.).

Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez gave the officers a reasonable

explanation both regarding how he got the money and why he had so much money with him.
Despite Trooper Otto's concerns that Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was lying, Trooper Otto
no effort to confirm or disprove Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's story or to determine whether he
fact worked at the Big Sky Dairy, had lived in

area for over a decade, and had family and

in the area. (See R., pp.201-02.) Instead, the
on the most pressing issue they
was

to appear."
court

turned a blind eye to

to determine-whether [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez]

p.203.)
found that Trooper Otto's subjective

that Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez

would fail to appear was objectively unreasonable and the State has failed to

otherwise.

Therefore, there was no probable cause to arrest Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez and the district court
suppressed the evidence seized as a result. (See R., pp.203-04.)

17

as a
arrest
the evidence
DATED this 15th

"F,'-""'J'

him.

January, 2016.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

18

VICTOR GARCIA-RODRIGUEZ
10 CALIFORNIA ST 2
ID 83330
ROBERT J ELGEE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
BRIAN TANNER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
to

at

19

